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SODOMY AND THE MARRIED MAN
Although the Constitution does not provide for a specific right of
privacy, the existence of such a right is beyond dispute.' The extent
of the right is, however, difficult to determine when one considers the
point beyond which the right of privacy will prohibit intrusion by
either state or federal authorities into an individual's affairs. Only by
balancing the individual's need for privacy with the state's interest in
regulating private conduct, can a delineation be made.
The question of where to draw the line was raised recently in Cotney
v. Henry .2 Petitioner with consent of his wife and within the exclusive
privacy of his bedroom committed an "abominable and detestable act"
violative of the Indiana Sodomy Statute.' After waiving trial by jury,
he was summarily sentenced to not less than two nor more than fourteen years in the Indiana Reformatory. In a habeas corpus proceeding,
petitioner sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Indiana statute,
but his writ was denied. On appeal the court concluded that an application of the Indiana Sodomy Statute to private, consensual acts between married persons might be an unconstitutional invasion of peti4
tioner's right of privacy.
As an independent doctrine the right of privacy attained legal recognition in an 1890 law review article written by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis.5 Prior to this time, the right of privacy had been
invoked as the underlying reason for prohibiting unreasonable searches
1Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961); State of Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 1968).
2 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
3 BURNS'

IND. STAT.

CH. 169 § 10-4221:

Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature with mankind or beast; or whoever entices, allures, instigates or aids any person under the
age of twenty one (21) years to commit masterbation or self-pollution, shall be
deemed guilty of sodomy and on conviction, shall be fined not less than one
hundred ($100.00) nor more than one thousand ($1,000.00) to which may be
added imprisonment in the state prison not less than two (2) nor more than
fourteen (14) years.
4 The court also determined petitioner's standing to seek a writ of habeas corpus in
a federal court, the affect of his guilty plea and the objectionable vagueness of the
Indiana Sodomy Statute. These questions are beyond the scope of this comment.
5Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See,
Rodgers, A New Era For Privacy, 43 N.D.L. REv. 253 (1967). Apparently the WarrenBrandeis article was prompted, at least in part, by distasteful newspaper publicity of
the "yellow journalism" variety. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 383 (1960).
For the development of the right of privacy as an actionable tort, see W. PRossER, THE
LAW op TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
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and seizures and the privilege against self-incrimination as protected by
the fourth and fifth amendments. 6 In Olnstead v. United States, while
sustaining the government's right to monitor private telephone conversations, the United States Supreme Court restricted rights in privacy to
"constitutionally protected areas." 7 However, in Katz v. United States,
the court expressly overruled the Olmstead decision by declaring that
the fourth amendment "protects people-and not simply areas." s The
court recognized the right of privacy as one of a number of rights sought
to be protected by the fourth amendment. 9
In Griswold v. Connecticut,10 the Supreme Court firmly solidified the
right of privacy as an independent doctrine by expressly predicating its
decision on an invasion of the marital right to privacy." Although concluding that a criminal statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was
an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, three concurring justices articulated three separate and distinct conceptual approaches for sustaining
the right of privacy. Justice Douglas, speaking for the court, considered privacy to be a right incidental to the expressed rights contained
within the first eight amendments, but one which is necessary to give
any positive meaning to the expressed rights.'2 Justice Goldberg, on
the other hand, suggested that the right of privacy was an independent
right contained within the Ninth Amendment, which includes a bundle
of unexpressed but fundamental rights too numerous to relate. 3 And
6 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

7 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Desist v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4225, 4226
(U.S. Mar. 24, 1969).

9 Id. at 350.
10 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

21Reaction to the Griswold decision is evidenced by the enormous amount of legal
literature. See e.g., Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanded Right of Privacy,
1966 Wis. L. Rxv. 979; Blackshield, Constitutionalism and Comstockery, 14 KAN. L.

Rxv. 403 (1966); Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MicH. L. Rxv. 197 (1965); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search
of a Doctrine, 64 MicE. L. REv. 219 (1965); Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The
Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law", 42 Non-E DAME LAw. 680 (1967);
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MicH. L. REv. 235 (1965). See generally, Redlich, Are

There Certain Rights Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962); A Refreshing Approach to the Right of Privacy, 5 WAsHnuRu LJ. 286 (1966); Privacy
After Griswold: Constitutional or Natural Right, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 813 (1966).
12 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

13Id. at 486-489. Until the Griswold decision, the ninth amendment remained one
of the least litigated amendments. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Tennessee Elec.
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Regardless of the conceptual approach adopted, the interest of the
individual in privacy must be simultaneously weighed against the interest
the state seeks to protect. In Griswold, the benefit derived from state
regulation did not outweigh the resulting encroachment upon the right
of privacy. Essentially the same factual situation exists in Cotney. Both
deal with consenting married adults and with the regulation of their
sexual relationship. Griswold struck down a statute banning the use of
contraceptives because neither society nor the individual suffered any
perceivable harm nor was there any corresponding benefit to society
by enforcement of such a statute; 15 therefore the need for regulation
was clearly outweighed by the need to protect marital privacy. In
Cotney, while the acts of sodomy seem more repugnant than the use
of contraceptives,"6 the harm suffered by society is equally imperceptible because the consenting parties are husband and wife.'Cotney, then, clearly represents an application of the *principles
espoused in the Griswold decision.'8 By adopting any one of the three
conceptual approaches advocating the right of privacy, public superPower Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
For the history of the ninth amendment and its possible application to future decisions,
see Adams, What Are The Rights Guaranteed By the Ninth Amendment? 53 A.B.A.J.
1033 (1967); Ritz, Ninth Amendment, 25 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1968); Kelley, The
Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 814 (1966).
14 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).
For a more expanded discussion of Justice Harlan's considerations, see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
15 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
16 This view points out the anomaly in legislating morality rather than harm. A
conservative Catholic would consider the use of contraceptives a mortal sin, equally as
repugnant as an act of sodomy. See generally Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin, 12 FLA. L.
REv. 83 (1959).
17 The concept of criminal conduct causing harm to society as opposed to harm to
an individual has historically been a subject of debate. See, Dworkin, Lord Devlin and
the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YAlE L.J. 986 (1966); Comment, Private ConsensualAdult
Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 581, 585 (1967); Monaghan, Obscenity 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 135-140 (1966); Rosen,
Contemporary Winds and Currents in Criminal Law, With Special Reference to
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Defense and Appreciation, 27 MD. L. REv.
103, 110 (1967); Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the
Law, 4 CALIF. WEST. L. REv. 115, 124 (1968).
18 The essence of the Cotney decision was specifically foreseen in Comment, The
Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CALw. WEST. L. REv. 115
(1968).
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vision of the private, marital sexual relationship through the imposition
of criminal sanctions may be eliminated. 19 This is not to say that the
right of privacy would prohibit prosecution of criminal acts between
husband and wife, e.g., murder or assault and battery.2 Inherent in
the Cotney decision is the implication that there is no crime committed
between a husband and wife who engage in acts of sodomy, and that
the marital right of privacy precludes any outside interference with
consensual acts producing no harm to the individual parties. 21 Under
these circumstances, condemnation by a legal code of mores constitutes
an injurious deprivation of private security, in view of the lack of
harm to the secular community, 22 the failure of uniform enforcement 2a
24
and the psychological harm done to the individual.

I. A. B., Jr.

19 The American Law Institute advocates this approach. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5
(1955). England presently allows consenting adults to engage in acts of homosexuality.
HALSBUEY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 12843 (3d Cum. Supp. 1968). There is a plethora of
material on the criminal nature of sodomy between consenting adults in private. For
an exhaustive study, see Project-The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643 (1966). See also Sodomy Between Husband and Wife-Grounds
for Divorce?, 3 J. Fm. L. 124 (1963).
20 This was the concern of justice Duffy, who desired to know the result ...
if
Comey had shot his wife in the privacy of their bedroom. . . ." Cotney v. Henry,
394 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
21 Besides the Indiana sodomy statute being susceptible to the constitutional objection
of vagueness and the "possible" failure to find a clear showing that the state had a clear
interest in preventing such relations, the court felt that the statute might not be applicable to married couples. Id. at 875. In a broad sense, what the Indiana court has
done (possibly unwittingly) is to question the applicability of any sodomy statute
to husband and wife.
22 See authority cited note 16 supra.
23 See Slovenko, Sex Mores and the Enforcement of the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study
of 24the Status Quo, 15 KAN. L. REv. 265, 271 (1967).
Slovenko and Phillips, Psychosexuality and the Criminal Law, 15 VAN. L. Rv.
797 (1962).

